MISSION
SUCCESS
At McAleese & Associates, a preeminent Government Contracts law practice based
in Washington, D.C., we pride ourselves on what we are able to attain for our
clients. Over the years we have had many significant successes-both large and
small. While we have had a number of victories in a traditional courtroom setting,
we highlight here some of the more prominent transactional victories we have achieved
over the past several years. Please contact us at info@mcaleese.com
if you would like more information on any of these topics. SELECT
EXAMPLES OF McALEESE& ASSOCIATES, P.C. "DISCRIMINATORS:"
| A) |
McAleese
& Associates, P.C. served as the Strategic Advisor
for Northop Grumman Corporation during the acquisition
of TRW, Inc. This involved a number of critical
issues because the acquisition was initiated on a hostile
basis, against the wishes of TRW Management. Immediate
issues that had to be confronted included legal obstacles
raised by various Ohio anti-takeover laws, coupled with
an independent evaluation of a fair price for the disparate
TRW conglomerate. Significant financial analysis was
also required to evaluate the independent value of TRW
under the TRW Restructuring Plan. McAleese evaluation
also included the competitive ability for TRW Space
& Electronics to maintain its competitive advantage
as a $1.2B stand-alone spacecraft house. Additional
priorities included product comparison and product groupings
for expertise with the other potential acquirers, including
Lockheed Martin, Boeing, General Dynamics, and BAE SYSTEMS.
Additional financial analysis had to be conducted to
objectively value the TRW shareholder benefits from
each of those potential combinations. Significant effort
was then expended in addressing potential concerns of
the Department of Defense and to the Department of Justice.
This included a particular emphasis on anticipating
and accommodating the concerns of impacted competitors,
particularly in both future military spacecraft production
and also battle management capabilities. This also required
evaluation from the perspective that key National Security
stakeholders would likely take, and the development
of specific remedies to ensure that those concerns were
properly addressed. Results were the successful acquisition
of TRW by Northop Grumman, followed by a complete acquisition
in late December 2002.
|
| B) |
Successfully
Supported Northrop Grumman in Acquisition of Newport
News Shipbuilding. McAleese & Associates, P.C. played
a critical role in defining and presenting the key issues
involving preservation of the Defense Industrial Base;
Antitrust/Competition; Cost Savings; Stakeholder concerns
at all levels; and budgetary/appropriations issues.
This effort included (1) constant surveillance of the
fluid situation; (2) constant recommendations to identify
priority issues and resultant strategy; (3) anticipating,
evaluating, and responding to concerns expressed by
both National Security Stakeholders, and also to arguments
raised by other impacted contractors; (4) drafting detailed
White Papers and Briefings for both DoD and Justice
Department; and (5) objectively articulating key competition
arguments publicly to fully educate both the National
Security and Financial Communities of developments in
real-time.
|
| C) |
Driving
consensus of National Security Stakeholders, Industry,
and Shareholders of the need for a compelling "National
Security/Business" Model. Given the meticulous
cost-accounting structures of government contracting,
contractors in defense-unique, Research & Development-intensive
areas must have constant capital infusion, via issuance
of stock or debt, to develop new areas of technical
expertise, and even to capitalize the front-end of major
production programs. The new Administration has clearly
committed to "lightning-strike" land forces,
"deep-strike" air assets, and "littoral-strike"
naval combat, in addition to layered Theater and National
Missile Defense (NMD). However, much of the success
of those combat doctrines -- particularly in Asia --
will be dictated by breakthroughs in critical "leap-ahead"
technologies in defense-unique, R&D-intensive capabilities.
These dual mandates require that DoD work hand-in-hand
with those responsive contractors to restructure troubled
legacy programs and to establish clear risk-to-reward
relationships to generate the critical mass to aggressively
drive breakthroughs in transformational technologies.
A
Compelling "National Security/ Business Restructuring"
Model is Critical to Long-Term U.S. National Security-Briefing
Book
A Compelling "National
Security/ Business Restructuring" Model is Critical
to Long-Term U.S. National Security-Accompanying
slides prior to September 11, 2001
Revised National
Security/Business Model Recommendations in the Wake
of September 11, 2001 Acts-of-War
A Compelling
"National Security/ Business Restructuring"
Model is Critical to Long-Term U.S. National Security
- Presentation at University of Minnesota, October 2001
|
| D) |
Introducing New "Military-Financial Complex"
Model for National Security. This requires that
we decisively re-dedicate ourselves to ensuring that
all actions are comprised of both a "compelling
National Security Case" and a "compelling
Business Case." The message in the Briefing
Charts is to declare the old "Military/Industrial
Complex" dead, and introduce the new "Military/Financial
Complex" in its place. Clearly, Wall Street
must have an integral seat at the table. Similarly,
Industry must adopt an "Up-or-Out" commitment
under the Full Subsystem Capability Model. We,
in Industry, must also demonstrate a compelling "National
Security Case/Business Case" to justify the
restructuring of major programs to rejuvenate the long-term
health of the U.S. defense industrial base. Lastly,
and just as importantly, key National Security "Stakeholders"
must then consciously couple the restructuring of big
ticket programs, with strong support to consolidate
the mid-tier industrial base, to create two World-Class
Full Subsystem Capability Suppliers in various sectors
for future platform competitions. Ultimately, Shareholders
will then reward those respective Full Subsystem Capability
Suppliers by taking long-term positions which will inject
the necessary capital to sustain long-term health of
key defense-unique technologies.
McAleese Aerospace
& Defense State of the Union Address: Creation of
the Military/Financial Complex
|
| E) |
Successfully supported Northrop Grumman acquisition
of Litton Industries. The acquisition of Litton
Industries by Northrop Grumman not only sustains critical
mass in such defense-unique, R&D-intensive areas
as Electronic Countermeasures (ECM), but it creates
sufficient overall mass to enable Northrop Grumman to
compete effectively as one of the U.S. "Big 3."
It will also enable the Navy/DoD to benefit from the
disciplined Northrop Grumman history of successful business
"turn-arounds." This will result in long-term
cost-savings, particularly in anemic ship construction
accounts. McAleese & Associates, P.C. supported
the objective evaluation of competitive impacts in such
areas as shipbuilding, ECMs, and the avoidance of "Vertical
Integration" in shipbuilding programs. We also
supported the development of both program models and
tools to clarify that there could be no threat of improper
Vertical Integration of Northrop Grumman electronics
into Litton Ships due to the clear separation of Hull/Mechanical/Electrical
(HME) subsystems from combat systems integration under
current Navy acquisition strategies.
|
| F) |
Successfully protected long-term competition in several
"high-end" defense electronics markets during
attempted Lockheed Martin acquisition of Northrop Grumman.
Within specific electronics subsystems, legitimate concern
arose that "Vertical Integration" could
threaten lives of American pilots from potential lack
of continued incentive for "cutting-edge"
innovation in several defense-unique, R&D-intensive
subsystems. (This did not result from any bad faith
on the part of the merging parties, but from the incremental
delegation of subsystem selection by DoD to platform
prime contractors through various Acquisition Reforms,
and the potential incentive for platform primes to then
favor "make" decisions in subsystem make-or-buy
selections to minimize revenue erosion as key tactical
aircraft programs were "stretched" and "fly-away"
quantities were reduced due to budgetary constraints).
On behalf of a particularly-impacted ECM contractor,
McAleese & Associates, P.C. carefully evaluated
competition, technical innovation, and price impacts
in multiple ECM relevant product markets -- from both
horizontal and vertical perspectives on a program-by-program
basis -- to ensure that compelling national security
interests fully justified advocating for a restructuring
of Lockheed Martin's planned acquisition. We then crafted
the program-specific arguments for divestiture of redundant
ECM capability, to maintain two industry houses with
full-ECM capabilities, as historically-separate countermeasure
subsystems evolved into multi-mission ECM subsystems.
We then successfully defended both the horizontal and
vertical arguments on multiple occasions during the
DoD/Justice antitrust factual deliberations, and also
during the highly-controversial public "Vertical
Integration" debates that arose as a direct result
of such industry-wide concerns. These ultimately translated
into five of the eleven Counts in the Complaint filed
by the Department of Justice against the proposed merger,
which was then abandoned by the Parties.
Aerospace Industry
Consolidation - News from the Front Lines -
|
| G) |
Supported CAE Inc. in successful acquisition of BAE
SYSTEMS Flight Simulation and Training (formerly Reflectone)
for $80 million during aggressive auction process.
McAleese & Associates, P.C. supported program and
operational valuations of Reflectone (primarily C-130
and rotary-wing simulators) from both the strategic
CAE/BAE SYSTEMS perspective and on stand-alone bases.
On behalf of CAE Inc., we worked with Seller to ensure
mutual consensus of de minimis risks that transaction
would fail to receive regulatory approval in the face
of CAE Inc's holding of almost 80% of commercial flight
simulator markets (due to CAE's resolve to wholly-fund
evolution of defense-unique "technical discriminators,"
as well as major production efficiency increases inherent
in CAE Inc.'s large commercial operations). We then
fully-supported all Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) antitrust
filings and informational briefings to both DoD and
Justice to successfully secure regulatory approval without
a Second-Request-for-Information and, without any consent
conditions.
|
| H) |
Supported $220 million sale of General Research Corporation
International (GRCI) to AT&T. The integral mating
of the national security assets of GRCI and AT&T
fosters greater competition by finally granting GRCI
both the financial capability and a full product range
to aggressively compete against much larger contractors
on high-risk C4ISR networks. McAleese & Associates,
P.C. supported the GRCI Team in due diligence disclosures.
We also evaluated the respective GRCI and AT&T core
competencies, and then crafted various national security
bases to support acquisition of GRCI by AT&T, despite
initial public skepticism of the benefits in both classified
and unclassified C4ISR areas. We then prepared all antitrust
filings and informational briefings for GRCI to support
successful regulatory approvals to close sale to AT&T
without a Second-Request-for-Information, and without
any consent conditions.
The
Strategic Combination of the National Security Assets
of GRC International, Inc. and AT&T National Information
Systems is Supported by a Compelling National Security
Case
The
GRCI/AT&T Merger's Importance To National Security
|
| I) |
Successfully educating key Pentagon, Administration,
and Congressional "Stakeholders" that trans-atlantic
consolidation of U.S./NATO defense contractors is critical
to pre-empting the formation of "Fortress Europe."
The Revolution-in-Military-Affairs commitment for DoD
to fight in concert with NATO Allies is inconsistent
with all-weather, real-time use of "smart weapons,"
absent "inter-operability" in key areas such
as C4ISR, rapid mobility, and logistics. Unlike past
co-development programs, "commingling" trans-atlantic
technology pools via U.S./NATO industrial base consolidation
will generate key "enabling technologies"
and directly save American lives on the battlefield.
Aerospace Industry Consolidation - The Supplier Race
to Acquire or Strategically Ally -
Trans-Atlantic Aerospace
& Defense Consolidation - At the Cross-Roads-
|
| J) |
Successfully qualified French Government-owned Messier-Dowty/SNECMA,
as a strong U.S. competitor for critical U.S. military
aircraft landing gear subsystems during merger of Goodrich
and Coltec. This was an enormous success, because
antitrust caselaw historically only allowed U.S. contractors
to be considered as "market participants"
in relevant DoD markets. Qualification of our client-Messier-Dowty/SNECMA
as a committed U.S. market competitor for DoD programs
-- despite its majority ownership by the French Government
-- was absolutely vital to protecting the Goodrich/Coltec
merger in the face of vehement public, political and
legal opposition by both Crane Co. and AlliedSignal.
Conversely, our ability to successfully secure DoD Customer
commitments to support a French Government-owned contractor,
on both specific programs and overall DoD market basis,
was critical to Messier-Dowty/SNECMA's commitment to
substantially increase its presence in the U.S. to compete
against a combined Goodrich/Coltec. Under these unique
circumstances, McAleese & Associates, P.C. successfully
supported Messier-Dowty in educating key DoD and FTC
Stakeholders that (1) Messier-Dowty would significantly
increase DoD competition, particularly in long lead-time
titanium landing gear, and (2) there was no basis to
opposition speculation (by other interested aerospace
contractors) that the French Government could cripple
DoD aircraft programs by ordering SNECMA to cease performance
in event of a U.S.-French political dispute, along with
a host of other anti-French allegations, e.g. sole source
landing gear selection for Airbus production, violation
of subsidies agreements (CASP), etc.
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