PRESS
ROOM
Environmental
Outsourcing and Privatization White Papers
The
attached "White Papers" regarding environmental outsourcing
and privatization (Proposed Environmental
Indemnification, Proposed Elimination
of Misconstrued False Claims Act Civil Liability, and Proposed
Extending DoD Environmental Initiatives to Active Installations)
have been derived from the proceedings at the National
Security Industrial Association Logistics and Management Committee's
(LoMC) Outsourcing and Privatization Workshop, held October
2-4, 1996, in Fredericksburg, Virginia. We were pleased with
the interest and keen insight of the workshop's participants
and the environmental implications confronting DoD's outsourcing
and privatization initiatives.
The objectives
of the environmental panel were to identify current impediments
to environmental outsourcing and privatization, and to develop
industry recommendations for fair and equitable solutions
to those problems. In order to contribute to a more effective
and balanced policy, we also solicited input from knowledgeable
individuals throughout the government on their beliefs on
the critical issues affecting environmental outsourcing and
privatization. The attached White Papers concern (1) the need
to readjust liabilities in environmental indemnification,
(2) the elimination of misconstrued False Claims Act civil
liability, and (3) the extension of benefits derived from
environmental protections at closing bases to active installations.
Industry
believes that an environmental outsourcing or privatization
project must provide a reasonable profit opportunity for private
industry. One suitable option to incentivize contractor investment
is multi-year (e.g., 7-10 years) periods of performance to
permit industry's recovery of initial investments. Industry
may well be willing to accept "share-of savings"
income if the current cost base is properly established and
a multi-year agreement is accordingly negotiated. Industry
further believes that, to generate real savings, it is essential
that industry be given the flexibility to manage the incumbent
civil service being outsourced, in a fair and efficient manner.
These
core beliefs, as well as the attached "White Papers,"
identify issues which industry believes is critical to the
success of future DoD policy on all outsourcing and privatization.
We genuinely support accelerated outsourcing, as we see this
as a unique opportunity for the Department of Defense to generate
substantial net savings from MilPer and O&M accounts.
These net savings then can be re-invested into the RDA accounts
to recapitalize our platforms for continued battlefield dominance.
We are available to discuss any aspect of these issues with
you or your staff. Please contact me if I can provide you
with any additional information
ENVIRONMENTAL
OUTSOURCING AND PRIVATIZATION WHITE PAPER
(Proposed Environmental Indemnification)
Issue:
The Department of Defense (DoD) must clearly affirm that
it will assume immediate liability for pre-existing environmental
damage to soil, groundwater, and other resources that impede
with private development on military land being converted
to civilian use or for conversion to privatization-in-place.
Background:
Once DoD decides to privatize a federal facility, complex
issues of environmental liability arise immediately. Because
of the years, frequently decades, it takes to clean up environmental
contamination sufficiently, contractors are often willing
to take possession of the property prior to the completion
of the necessary clean-up with reasonable assurances of indemnification
from the government. Consequently, definitive allocations
of liability need to be made, so as to represent the obligations
of each of the parties in a fair and equitable manner at the
time of privatization. However, DoD often maintains that it
will grant indemnification for environmental conditions and
clean-up only to the extent provided by statute. This confuses
legitimate risk allocation and increases the probability of
disputes and litigation in the outlying years.
This position
adversely affects DoD's privatization efforts. For example,
in both base closure and redevelopment of housing, utilities,
and other functions, there is real potential that soil and
groundwater contamination can interrupt excavation required
for the installation of utility lines and laying of new foundations.
Such interruption necessarily delays the completion of the
project; thus, slowing the transition of the facility to the
private sector and realization of valuable savings by DoD.
If DoD insists on shifting liability to the private sector,
and addressing these problems without adequate pre-contract
consultation with its contractors, the savings objectives
of privatization and redevelopment will not be achieved. Specifically,
DoD's vital base reuse and housing revitalization programs
will prove unsuccessful, as contractors will be increasingly
unwilling to risk significant investment in particular projects
due to the potentially severe environmental liabilities and
financing costs. The difficulties at Norton Air Force Base
in San Bernardino, California illustrate this problem. A Lockheed
tenant operation was closed for lack of profitability, after
the task of laying new flooring for a jumbo jet aircraft repair
hanger was delayed for over a year due to environmental concerns
at the site.
Industry
Recommendation: Since DoD is already liable for cleanup
under current statute, it should be willing to adapt and reprioritize
its clean-up expenditures and activities to accommodate the
mutual interests of DoD, contractors, and the Local Redevelopment
Authorities (LRA). This will enable DoD to achieve timely
completion of privately financed construction projects on
installations, both active and closing. If the private sector
is injudiciously forced to bear the cost of clean-up in order
to complete its projects, there is a substantial risk that
it will file claims and lawsuits against DoD for resultant
clean-up costs. The implications of lost profits, lost time,
needlessly expended legal fees, and dissipated customer goodwill
are obvious.
There
are several readily available solutions that enable the parties
to avoid this problem. First, although DoD has been reluctant
to expand its liabilities beyond the statutory grants of indemnification,
there is no restriction on DoD from assuming responsibility
by contract for the condition of the property it once owned
or occupied. The government's environmental record while on
the land could be properly assessed through its environmental
baseline survey. The purpose of the survey would be to reveal
any pre-existing contamination to the property and environmental
threats to the community's health and safety, prior to the
contractor taking control of the property. Global indemnifications
for environmental liability already are standard in the commercial
world, and are critical in negotiations for the transfer of
commercial property. There is no reason why government agencies
should be held to a lesser standard of responsibility than
their commercial counterparts when transferring property.
A global indemnification for environmental liabilities does
not increase the government's statutory liabilities for pre-existing
contamination. Rather, it avoids the inherent difficulties
the government faces with the Anti-Deficiency Act when executing
indemnification agreements with privatizing contractors and
LRAs. Moreover, global indemnifications also can be applied
in the context of privatization-in place, as well as outsourcing.
However, these global indemnifications must be intricately
tied to rigorous transition plans performed by legal counsel
once on-site to confirm the accuracy of, and to identify any
inconsistencies in, the government's initial baseline survey.
Second,
DoD should consider using Public Law (PL) 85-804 to indemnify
contractors for pre-existing environmental liabilities. DoD
already has used PL 85-804 to cover contractor activities
at Lake City and the Newport Army Ammunition Plants. In such
actions, the term "unusually hazardous activities"
was defined to encompass both sudden and non sudden environmental
damages. Third, DoD should implement a policy that, where
feasible, it will take possession of the contaminated soil
and expedite its removal from the site so that contractor
excavation and construction can continue without interference.
The parties then can determine the most appropriate method
of remediating the removed contamination with minimal delay
of the privatization efforts (e.g., soil treatment in-place).
The implementation
of these solutions should enable DoD to profit over the long
term by increasing the value of its land at closing bases,
realizing increased rental revenues, and speeding the transfer
of property at closing bases. This will also encourage the
private sector to partner with DoD in privatization activities
requiring the investment of private funds on DoD premises.
If utilized in the proper manner, such reasonable policy will
result ultimately in lower transition costs, and reduced long
term liability to DoD. Those net savings can then be shifted
to modernization accounts so critical to maintaining an Armed
Forces which can deter aggression by its technological ability
to dominate the battlespace.
ENVIRONMENTAL
OUTSOURCING AND PRIVATIZATION WHITE PAPER
(Proposed Elimination of Misconstrued False Claims Act Civil
Liability)
Issue:
The standard FAR environmental clause should be revised to
eliminate the inadvertent risk of unjustified False Claims
Act (FCA) claims against contractors.
Background:
One of the most unique characteristics of the civil FCA
is the ability of private citizens to bring civil actions
(qui tam suits) against government contractors on behalf of
the United States Government. The sheer number of qui tam
actions has increased over the past several years. With continued
emphasis on privatization and outsourcing, the increase may
well continue, rather than decline. As defense contractors
decrease the historic size of their work forces, and more
work is shifted to the private sector from ongoing government
depots, former employees and other individuals will use the
FCA, in combination with other environmental laws, to file
qui tam civil actions against federal contractors. Investigations
and legal proceedings based on the FCA have arisen because
of the current FAR clause mandating that all federal contracts
require contractors to "comply with all Federal, state,
and local environmental laws." Because it is nearly impossible
for contractors, as well as for the Department of Defense
(DoD) itself, to achieve "perfect" compliance with
all environmental standards, potential plaintiffs, or "relators,"
can allege that the contractor made a false claim to the government
in that it failed to "comply with all Federal, state,
and local environmental laws."
Additionally,
acts avoiding an obligation to pay or transmit money or property
to the government also are subject to FCA jurisdiction ("reverse
false claims") (see 31 U.S.C. º 3729(a)(7)). Contractors
must avoid knowingly subjecting the government to financial
loss, whether it be from submitting fraudulent requests for
equitable adjustments or engineering change proposals, or
not furnishing the property in the contractually obligated
condition (e.g., not contaminated). In the civil context,
contractors "knowingly" submit a false claim when
they (1) have actual knowledge of the (false) information,
(2) act in "deliberate ignorance" of the truth or
falsity of the information, or (3) act in "reckless disregard"
of the truth of falsity of the information. No specific intent
to defraud is required. Knowingly submitting a false claim
will subject contractors to severe civil liability under the
FCA as well as diminished customer goodwill. Such civil liability
includes being fined $5,000 to $10,000 per false claim, in
addition to treble damages of the actual false claim, or amount
of penalty or fine in case of reverse false claim.
Industry
Recommendation: Defense contractors that perform clean-up
activities at contaminated sites clearly recognize that they
must continue to scrutinize their technical processes and
administrative procedures to ensure that (1) the work they
are obligated contractually to perform is carried out in a
satisfactory manner, and (2) their billing procedures employ
the necessary safeguards to prevent the contractor from "knowingly"
incorrectly billing the government. Additionally, contractors
must understand the need to work with the government and its
employees to institute prophylactic measures to ensure that
transitioning the workforce to the private sector will not
lead to their organizations expending substantial resources
to defend against unfounded qui tam actions. As such, contractors'
well-defined transition plans and compliance programs, developed
in advance of the privatization or outsourcing and with the
assistance of in-house/outside counsel, are critical in ensuring
that the contractor's protections are maximized, and potential
liabilities.
The government
can implement several measures to eliminate this unnecessary
risk to contractors. First, the standard FAR environmental
clause could be modified to read: "compliance with all
Federal, state, and local environmental laws to the reasonable
satisfaction of the relevant environmental regulatory agencies."
This simple revision makes it clear that the standard of compliance
is established by the Environmental Protection Agency, state,
and local regulatory agencies. The current regulatory language
demands a strict liability standard of compliance, leaving
environmental determinations solely in the hands of the Federal
courts, which have less inherent expertise, or training, in
technical environmental matters and the practicalities of
environmental enforcement. Second, all of the contractor's
environmental compliance records and defense costs could be
periodically made available to the EPA, other regulatory agency,
or contracting officer for inspection. In many instances,
this could preclude a relator from proceeding with a qui tam
action, because the information already would have been publicly
disclosed and in the public domain. Once a contractor then
corrects any noncompliance problems, the appropriate government
personnel could incorporate the relevant documentation or
amended environmental clause into the contract. This level
of "clean hands" and proactive approach would eliminate
any allegations of contractor concealment of noncompliance
by potential qui tam plaintiffs. In sum, these provisions
would greatly protect contractors from inadvertently incurring
liability. Implementation of these, or similar, measures ultimately
would reduce DoD costs, because contractors would no longer
have to calculate the costs of this risk and "bake"
that liability into their contract proposals.
ENVIRONMENTAL
OUTSOURCING AND PRIVATIZATION WHITE PAPER
(Proposed Extending DoD Environmental Initiatives to Active
Installations)
Issue:
The Department of Defense (DoD) must extend environmental
protections available at closing bases to those active and
operating bases with privatization projects.
Background:
As DoD seeks to privatize activities on military installations,
such as military housing and the operation of utility systems,
contractors will be exposed increasingly to potential liability
and the risk for the environmental condition of the premises
they use, and for environmental compliance and natural resource
protection in the vicinity of those premises.
Industry
Recommendation: These risks and liabilities have been
addressed forcefully in the Base Realignment and Closure Act
and follow-on redevelopment programs. Moreover, significant
amendments to environmental laws have given protection to
private entities which lease or purchase military real estate
and buildings. These protections include, such examples as
a permanent right of indemnification from the government against
toxic tort claims, a warranty by the government that an environmental
clean-up of the installation or particular piece of property
has been completed, detailed Environmental Baseline Survey
and Findings of Suitability to Lease or Transfer that has
been approved by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
and a short sixty (60) day statute of limitations for challenges
under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
Industry
believes that there is no reason why these safeguards cannot
be extended to contractors which participate in DoD privatization
projects at military facilities that are not subject to closure.
These provisions could be added as an omnibus provision to
the Fiscal Year 1998 Defense Authorization Act, which would
apply statutory language already incorporated in the BRAC
Act's laws to all military privatization projects. Alternatively,
such protections could be included in the significant Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
reform legislation scheduled to be enacted during the 105th
Congress.
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